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Table: Results of the Expert Survey 
 
Referendum Pledges 
 
The government pledged the referendum… 
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p
erts 
…to shore up its 
domestic support 
(Q1) 
…to encourage 
divisions within 
the opposition 
(Q2) 
…to defuse 
internal divisions 
on the issue 
within the 
government (Q3) 
…to take the issue 
off the agenda of 
interparty 
competition (Q4) 
…to further 
progress towards 
European 
unification (Q5) 
...to strengthen its 
bargaining power 
at the European 
level (Q6) 
...because it was 
judged the only 
way to obtain 
domestic 
ratification (Q7) 
France (1972) 
First Enlargement of EC 
3.14 [1.12] 3.57 [1.40] 3.57 [1.05] 2.29 [1.03] 2.86 [1.25] 3.43 [1.18] 1.86 [1.36] 7 
Norway (1972) 
Accession 
2.00 [0.94] 1.44 [0.50] 3.33 [0.94] 4.00 [1.05] 1.22 [0.42] 1.78 [0.42] 2.89 [1.10] 9 
Switzerland (1972) 
Free Trade Agreement 
3.40 [1.36] 1.20 [0.40] 1.00 [0.00] 1.20 [0.40] 1.40 [0.80] 1.80 [0.98] 3.00 [1.41] 5 
Britain (1975) 
Terms of Membership 
3.80 [1.17] 3.20 [1.47] 5.00 [0.00] 2.40 [1.02] 1.20 [0.4] 2.00 [0.63] 1.80 [0.4] 5 
Greenland (1982) 
Leaving the EC 
2.00 [1.00] 1.00 [0.00] 1.00 [0.00] 1.00 [0.00] 1.00 [0.00] 2.50 [1.50] 1.00 [0.00] 4 
Denmark (1986) 
SEA 
4.40 [0.80] 2.80 [0.98] 1.60 [0.49] 4.20 [0.75] 2.40 [0.8] 1.60 [0.49] 4.20 [1.17] 5 
Italy (1989) 
Constitution for Europe 
2.40 [1.02] 1.40 [0.49] 1.60 [1.20] 1.80 [1.60] 3.40 [1.36] 2.00 [1.55] 1.00 [0.00] 5 
France (1992) 
Maastricht 
4.22 [0.79] 4.11 [0.99] 2.56 [0.68] 2.44 [0.96] 3.89 [0.74] 3.67 [1.15] 2.11 [1.45] 9 
Switzerland (1992) 
European Economic Area 
2.20 [0.98] 1.20 [0.40] 2.00 [0.63] 1.40 [0.49] 1.80 [0.98] 2.20 [0.75] 4.00 [1.55] 5 
Finland/Åland Islands (1994) 
Accession 
2.50/2.00 
[0.50/0.00] 
1.25/1.50 
[0.43/0.50] 
2.75/3.00 
[0.43/0.00] 
3.00/4.00 
[1.41/1.00] 
2.00/1.50 
[0.00/0.50] 
1.50/3.00 
[0.50/0.00] 
4.00/4.50 
[0.70/0.50] 
4 
Sweden (1994) 
Accession 
2.30 [1.19] 1.70 [0.64] 3.50 [0.81] 3.20 [0.98] 2.60 [0.92] 3.10 [1.64] 4.30 [0.78] 10 
Britain (1996) 
Euro 
3.80 [0.98] 2.00 [0.00] 4.60 [0.49] 3.00 [1.41] 1.00 [0.00] 2.00 [1.09] 3.40 [1.36] 5 
Britain (1997) 
Euro 
4.00 [1.09] 3.00 [1.41] 3.00 [0.89] 4.20 [0.98] 2.40 [1.02] 2.20 [0.75] 3.80 [1.17] 5 
Malta (2003) 
Accession 
4.25 [0.43] 3.50 [1.50] 1.25 [0.43] 2.75 [1.30] 2.50 [1.12] 2.50 [0.87] 3.50 [1.12] 4 
Referendum Pledges 
The government pledged the referendum to… 
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…to defuse 
internal divisions 
on the issue 
within the 
government (Q3) 
…to take the issue 
off the agenda of 
interparty 
competition (Q4) 
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bargaining power 
at the European 
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...because it was 
judged the only 
way to obtain 
domestic 
ratification (Q7) 
Sweden (2003) 
Euro 
2.20 [0.98] 1.80 [0.60] 3.20 [1.40] 3.00 [1.18] 2.20 [0.87] 2.60 [1.43] 4.00 [1.18] 10 
Portugal (2003) 
TCE 
3.25 [0.83] 2.75 [1.09] 1.75 [0.83] 2.25 [0.43] 2.50 [0.50] 2.50 [1.12] 3.00 [1.58] 4 
Czech Republic (2003) 
Accession 
2.50 [1.00] 2.38 [0.86] 1.13 [0.33] 2.13 [1.27] 2.86 [1.12] 2.50 [1.32] 1.63 [0.70] 8 
Poland (2003) 
Accession 
3.00 [1.15] 2.00 [1.15] 1.78 [0.79] 2.00 [0.82] 4.00 [1.25] 2.78 [1.40] 3.00 [1.49] 9 
Britain (2004) 
TCE 
4.20 [0.75] 2.20 [0.75] 2.60 [1.02] 4.20 [0.75] 2.00 [0.63] 2.00 [0.63] 2.60 [1.36] 5 
France (2004) 
Accession of Turkey 
3.78 [1.03] 2.67 [1.05] 3.11 [1.36] 3.11 [1.19] 2.11 [1.19] 3.22 [0.92] 2.50 [1.58] 9 
Spain (2005) 
TCE 
3.57 [0.90] 1.57 [0.49] 1.29 [0.45] 2.14 [0.99] 3.29 [1.16] 2.71 [1.16] 1.71 [1.03] 7 
France (2005) 
TCE 
4.00 [1.05] 4.00 [1.05] 3.11 [0.99] 2.22 [1.13] 2.78 [1.13] 3.22 [1.03] 2.00 [1.25] 9 
Luxembourg (2005) 
TCE 
2.80 [0.98] 2.40 [0.80] 2.00 [1.55] 2.20 [1.47] 4.60 [0.49] 3.60 [1.02] 1.40 [0.80] 5 
Poland (2005) 
TCE 
2.56 [0.68] 2.56 [0.96] 1.89 [1.10] 3.00 [1.25] 2.67 [1.15] 2.78 [1.03] 4.00 [1.00] 9 
Czech Republic (2005) 
TCE 
3.29 [1.03] 3.00 [1.07] 1.14 [0.35] 2.29 [1.16] 2.00 [0.93] 2.14 [0.99] 3.29 [1.28] 7 
Austria (2008) 
Accession of Turkey 
3.71 [1.28] 1.71 [1.03] 2.14 [0.83] 3.71 [1.28] 1.14 [0.35] 1.29 [0.45] 1.43 [0.73] 7 
Britain (2010) 
Future transfers of power 
3.80 [0.75] 1.80 [0.4] 3.40 [0.80] 2.00 [1.09] 1.00 [0.00] 2.40 [1.02] 1.80 [1.17] 5 
Data: Expert survey. Mean values of expert responses. 1= the rationale played no role at all; 2=…only a marginal role; 3=…a somewhat important role; 4=…an important role; 
5=…a very important role. Figures in square brackets: standard deviations 
 
